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A two person zero sum game describes a world that the two players 
influence and appreciate in opposite ways: One’s gain is always equal to the 
other’s loss. We call these two players Xavier and Yves. We denote by X the 
set of pure strategies of Xavier and by E’ the set of pure strategies of Yves. 
If  Xavier chooses a pure strategy J ES and Yves chooses a pure strategy 
y  E I) then Xavier’s payoff (his utility) is g(x, y) where g is a function: 
g: s x I’+ R. (0.1) 
Now, for the same pair (x, y), Yves’s payoff is -g(s, y). This means that 
Xavier tries to maximizeg, while Yves tries to minimize it. There are basically 
two kinds of games. 
Case 1. sups inf, g(N, y) = inf, supc g(x, y). 
Let us denote by z’ this common value and call it the eahe of the game. 
If  we assume there is an .r~ such that supe inf,U g(.r, y) = inf,g(.?, y), then 
-Xavier, when playing 3~, is guaranteed to have a payoff greater than or equal 
to %‘: 
QyE z- 57 c< g@, y). (O-2) 
Similarly, if we assume there is a 1 such that inf, sups g(x, y) = supr g(s, j$ 
then Yves, when playing 7, is guaranteed to have a payoff greater than or 
equal to -2~: 
vx E Xg(x, 7’) :z 2’. 
Thus, the pair (2, 9) has the saddle point property: 
(0.3) 
V(.r, y) E ii- ” I- g(x, J) G g(“f, y) d g(“K Y). (0.4) 
* This is an abridged version of the author’s Doctoral Dissertation. Easy proofs are 
omitted. For the difficult results the main steps of the proof are indicated. 
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This means that f  is an optimal strategy of Xavier and 7 an optimal strategy 
of Yves. 
Case 2. supz inf, g(x, y) < inf, supx g(.x, y). 
In this case, there is no saddle point (0.4) and no optimal strategy for 
Xavier or Yves. We can just say that Xavier can enforce a payoff greater than 
or equal to supa inf, g(x, y) and that Yves can enforce a payoff less than or 
equal to inf, sups g(x, y). So, if we want to assign to a game a value in some 
sense, then this value must belong to the duality interval: 
[qp i;fg(r, y), i;f yp g(x, r)l. (0.5) 
The aim of game theory is to provide, in this second case, some justification 
for the words “value” and “optimal strategies.” For that purpose it will prove 
useful (or even necessary) to enrich the mathematical structure of the game. 
One way (the usual way) is the “mixed extension” of the game (von 
Neumann-Morgenstern): We assume that Xavier can play not only a pure 
strategy N E X, but also according to every probability distribution p on S. 
Similarly, we assume that Yves can play every distribution of probability 
v  on I’. I f  the pair (cl, V) is chosen by Xavier and Yves, the resulting payoff 
will be: 
The basic von Neumann minimax theorem asserts that this new game has 
always (for every initial payoff functiong) a saddle point pair, and then a value, 
called the mixed v&e of the game (0.1) (in the case where ,Y and I7 are 
finite). 
Another way is what we call here the “ergodic extension,” which is 
described as follows: Xavier chooses a pure strategy x1 ; then Yves, knowing 
sr , chooses a pure strategy y1 ; then Xavier, knowing .r, and yr , chooses 
an sa ; then Yves, knowing .rr , yr and VQ , chooses an ya and so on.... The 
new payoff is now 
We shall see (II, Section 3) that this new game has a saddle point pair (if, 
for instance, X and Y are finite), and the corresponding value is called the 
ergodic value of the game (0.1). (It is also shown that the ergodic value is the 
same if Yves is the “starting” player.) 
In the two previous examples, we have defined two quite different “ways 
of playing” the initia1 game (0.1). In this paper we shall define a large family 
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of abstract “extensions” (including the above mixed and ergodic extension). 
Then we shall classify these abstract extensions according to the type of 
exchange of information involved. Finally we shall give two characterizations 
of all possible “values” obtained by abstract extensions (including, therefore, 
the mixed value and the ergodic value). 
Notation. I f  2 is a set, d(Z) denotes the vector space of bounded functions 
defined on 2. The space d(Z) is a Banach space, supplied with the sup norm: 
The Banach space S?‘(Z) is partially ordered by: 
12, 3 h, : v’z E z h&s) >, h&z). (0.9) 
We denote by 19 E d(Z) the constant function equal to 1. We denote by 
d’(Z) the topological dual of d(Z) and by &‘(Z) the simplex of ,8(Z), 
i.e., the convex (and weakly compact) subset of those linear forms p E M(Z) 
which are “positive” and have a “total weight” of 1: 
v/z Ed(z): I2 > 0 => [p, h] > 0 (0.10) 
[II, 01 = 1. (0.11) 
Finally we denote by S the canonical one-to-one mapping: 
6: z-+ Cdl’(Z). vz E z Vh E d(Z): [6; ) h] = h(z). (0.12) 
I. EXTENSIONS 
I. 1. Definition 
Let X and Y be two given sets: We call ,V the set of pure strategies of 
Xavier and Y the set of pure strategies of Yves. 
DEFINITION I. 1. An extension p of the games on X x Y is a Stuple 
p = (3, 23, i, j, n) (I.11 
where i and j are two one-to-one mappings: 
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where r is a linear operator 
such that 
?T : d(X x Y) ---f &?(X x JY) (1.3) 
and such that 
r is positive and CT(~) = 0 (1.4) 
We call 9 and CV the sets of extended strategies: The one-to-one mapping i 
identifies X with a subset of ?.F, and j identifies Y with a subset of CV (1.2). 
The choice of a function g E&(X x Y) defines an “initial game” (Xavier 
maximizing g and Yves minimizing g) and the “extended game” of this 
initial game is described in normal form by the payoff function: 
77g:x x yY+R. (1.6) 
Thus we call n the extension operator. The assumption (1.4) means that r is 
increasing and n leaves the constant functions invariant. The assumption 
(1.5-i) means that, if Xavier plays the “pure” strategy i(x) in the extended 
game, he guarantees at least the same payoff as guaranteed by playing the 
pure strategy x in the initial game. If (1.5-i) fails, Xavier could reasonably 
refuse to play the extended game. Similarly, the assumption (1.5-ii) means 
that using a “pure” strategy j(y) in the extended game is not worse for 
Yves than using y in the initial game. 
PROPOSITION 1.1. Let p = (SF’, C!l, i, j, Z-) be an extension of the games on 
X x Y. We have: 
and 
Vg E &42(X x Y) vb, Y> E X x Y v(i(x), i(r)) = g(x, Y> (1.7) 
Vg E d(X x IT) sup inf g(x, y) < s;p inf ng(g(5,~) 
x 3’ ?) 
< inf sup 7i-g([, 7) < inf sup g(x, y). 
W3) 
9 E Y x 
Proof. Inequalities (1.8) follow clearly from (1.5) and (1.7) follows from 
Proposition I.2 below. 
The property (1.7) shows that the restriction of rrg to the subset i(X) x j(Y) 
of .F x CV is equal to g, and justifies for rg the name: “extended payoff 
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function.” Moreover, the relation (1.8) h s ows that, through the extension, 
the duality interval must be nonincreasing. In other words, if the initial 
payoff function g has a value, the extended payoff function rrg has the same 
value. 
The most interesting extensions are those such that ng has always a 
value (even if g doesn’t have any), and this value therefore belongs to the 
duality interval of g. 
DEFINITION 1.2. An extensionp = (Z, ‘J, i, i, rr) is said to be playable if: 
Vg E d(X X Y) syp i;f ng([, 7) = inf syp 77g(t, 7). 
7) 
(I-9) 
A playable extension describes then a “way of playing” the initial game (0. l), 
by extending the strategy spaces and the payoff function in such a way that 
the extended game is playable (has a value). In part III of this paper we give 
two different characterizations of the playable extensions. 
1.2. .4djoint Form of an Extension 
The adjoint form of an extension is the most suitable tool for its study. 
We denote by @ the tensor product (which is unambiguously defined if p or v  
is a discrete measure): 
p E dl’(S); v  E .nz,‘( I-) p @ v  E d;‘(X x Y). (1.10) 
PROPOSITION 1.2. Let X and 1. be jixed. We assume that (S!“, “Y) are jixed 
extended strategy spaces and (i, j) are one-to-one mappings satisfying (1.2). 
Then the relation: 
vg E d(X x Y) V(E, 17) E 3 x ‘y q(5, 7) = b*(E, rl), 81, (1.11) 
dejines a bijective mapping, from the set of the linear operators rr verifring (1.3), 
(1.4), (IS), onto the set of the mappings n*: 
7r* : 1’ x JY + dl’(X x I-), (1.12) 
verifying: 
(i) Vx E X VTEY rr*(i(x), 7]) E 6, 0 dl’( I-) 
(ii) Vy E I- VEET- ~*(t,i(y)) E ,Pa,‘(-y> 0 6,. 
(1.13) 
Proof. The definition (I. 11) of n* can be rewritten as: 
vg E s4(X x Y) V(& 7j) E F ?< 3 [S, Q s, , rg] = [T*(5, q), g] (I. 14) 
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where the first bracket corresponds to the duality between &‘(a x 03) and 
&(ZE x V), and the second bracket corresponds to the duality between 
&‘(X x Y) and &(X x Y). Th u n* appears as the restriction to S(x) @ s 
SW;/) of the adjoint operator of V. The end of the proof is a standard exercise 
on adjoint operators, using the Hahn-Banach theorem. 
1.3. Examples 
(a) The main example of extension of the games on X x Y is the 
mixed extension p, : 
P,, = @G’(X), &l’(Y), 6, I 8Y 9 %n), (1.15) 
where 6, and 6, are the canonical embeddings (0.12), identifying X and Y 
with the Dirac measures of &i’(X) and &i’(Y), and where n, is the following 
operator (we assume that X and/or Y is j&e): 
Vg E d(X x Y) V(,, v) E .&‘(X) x cdl’(Y) : rr,g(y, v) = [p @ v, g]. (1.16) 
In other words, the adjoint form rr,* of TK~ is: 
p E g’(x), Y E &‘(Y) : ?r, *(p, v) = cL @ v E .d,‘(S x Y). (1.17) 
For every g E d(X) the function rrg is clearly affine with respect to p and V, 
and continuous if we supply .J41;‘(X) and &i’(Y) with their weak topologies. 
For these topologies J&‘(X) and dl’(Y) are moreover convex compact. 
Then rr,g has a saddle point (see [2]) an a value. This proves the mixed d 
extension is playable. We denote by v,(g), the “mixed value” of g. 
(b) We give now another example: Let F( Y, X) be the set of mappings 
from Y into X. There is a canonical embedding i from X into S(Y, X) 
i : X -+ F(Y, X) Vy E Y i(x)(y) = x. (1.18) 
If P E S(Y, X) maps Y into X and y E Y, we put: 
vg E Jqx x E’) @(P, Y> = g(P(y), Y)- (1.19) 
We have thus defined an extension p: 
p = (@yK X), y, 6 i, TT) (1.20) 
where j is the identity mapping. The meaning of this extension is the 
following: Yves chooses first his pure strategy y, and then Xavier chooses his 
pure strategy x knowing y. Clearly this extension is playable and the value 
of rrg is inf, sup% g(x, y). The extension (1.20) is thus the best one for Xavier. 
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(c) Finally we give a third example of extension. In this extension we 
have: X = Y = (1, 2). A function g E &‘(X x Y) can be represented 
(as is usual in game theory) as a (2-2) matrix whose rows “are” the elements 
of X and whose columns “are” the elements of Y: 
g = [,” ;] * (1.21) 
Now we have: 5? = g = (1, 2, 3, 4) and the one-to-one mappings i and 
j are simply the identity mapping. The extended payoff function rg can also 
be described by a (4-4) matrix, and the property (1.7) shows that the upper 
left (2-2) submatrix of this matrix is g. We consider now the particular 
example in which the extended payoff function ng of the previous g (1.21) is: 
rrg = 
-a b b 









C I* (1.22) 
One veriies easily that v satisfies properties (1.4) and (1.5). Thus (1.22) 
describes an extension of the games on X x Y. The “way of playing” the 
initial game corresponding to this abstract extension is not so intuitive. 
In fact we shall see in II, Section 3 that this extension (1.22) is the ergodic 
one, which has been already described in the introduction. But one can note 
directly in (1.22) that this extension is playable, that is, this matrix (1.22) 
has a saddle point for every given a, b, c, d (we leave the proof to the reader). 
II. EXTENSIONS AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION 
11.1. Extensions without Exchange of Information 
In this section we assume that X and/or Y is finite. 
We identify &z(X) with the subset of sl(X x Y) of those functions 
g(x, y) which do not depend on y. Similarly, J%‘(Y) is regarded as the subset 
of .M(X x Y) of those functions which do not depend on x. 
DEFINITION 11.1. An extension p = (3, CV, i, j, ?T) is said to be without 
exchange of information if the following property holds: 
n[d( Y)] c az(?Y). (11.1) 
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If the initial payoff function g does not depend on y (g E d(X)), this means 
that Yves is a “dummy” in this game. If (11.1) holds, Yves remains a “dummy” 
in the extended game (ng E a(Z)). W e c aim that, if Yves were no longer a 1 
dummy in the extended game (rrg $&(a)), then Yves has some influence 
on the extended payoff function, and this influence necessary comes from an 
“exchange of information.” For instance, if p = (T( Y, X), Y, i, i, z-) is the 
previous example (1.20), then we have (by (1.19)), if g belongs to ,ti(X): 
ng(P, y) = g(P(y), Y) = g(P(Y))* (11.2) 
Thus, Yves is not a dummy in the extended game (of course if Xavier plays 
“well,” the influence of Yves in the extended game is not relevant). 
The typical example of an extension without exchange of information is 
the mixed one, for which (11.1) clearly holds. We show, in Theorem II.1 
below, that all the extensions without exchange of information are closely 
related to the mixed one. This is another justification of the term “without 
exchange of information.” The sequential extension (see Definition II.2 
below) also illustrates this term. But the main justification is Theorem III.2 
(part III, Section 2). 
THEOREM 11.1. Let p = (3, OJ, i, j, n) be an extension without exchange 
of information. Then for every initial pay08 function g E d(X x Y), if v,(g) 
denotes the mixed value of g, we have: 
sup inf g@, y) < syp inf vg(t, rl) < v,(g) < inf s!P ng(t,y> 
x y 11 1) 
< inf sup g(.y, y). 
(11.3) 
Y x 
Theorem 11.1 implies that, if an extension without exchange of information 
is playable, then the value of the extended game 7rg is the mixed value of g 
(for every g). The playable extensions without exchange of information are 
then “other versions” of the mixed game. 
Proof of Theorem 11.1. As a consequence of relation (11.1) one shows 
first that, for every 4 E %‘, there exists a linear form a(4) E &i’(X) such that: 
VY E Y n*(E, j(y)) = 40 0 6,. (11.4) 
Similarly, for every v E W, there exists a linear form b(T) E s4,‘(Y) such that: 
Vx E X r*(i(x), q) = 6, @ b(q). (11.5) 
Now, the relation (11.4) implies, for every fixed 5: 
$i dt, 17) < ~?l~*(~d3% 81 = $$b(O 0 6, ,A. (11.6) 
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Note that 
Then (11.6) and (11.7) imply the left part of inequalities (11.3). Similarly 
(11.5) implies the right part. 1 
We now define a family of extensions without exchange of information: 
The sequential extensions. We denote by 8 the set of sequences 2 = (xJieH 
with elements in X, and by 7 the set of sequences J = (yj)iEN with elements 
in Y. There is a natural embedding i from X into X, and j from Y into P: 
i: x + 2 i(x) = (s )..., s ,... ); 
j: k-+ fj(y) = (y ,..., y ,... )# 
(11.8) 
DEFINITION 11.2. Let a = (aij)i,jsN be an element of P(W) such that: 
Vi, j: aii >, 0; 
+;r 
(11.9) 
Then p, = (a, k”‘, i, j, VJ is an extension, where rr, is defined by: 
V(Q)EX x F-, nag(z, j) = C aijdxi 3 Yi). (11.10) 
i,j=l 
We call it a sequential extension. It is an extension without exchange of 
information. 
A sequential extension is described by the following “way of playing” 
the initial game: Xavier chooses secretly a sequence (QieN of pure strategies, 
and Yves chooses secretly a sequence (yj)ierm of pure strategies. The payoff 
is then the “generalized discounted” summation (11.10) of the g(xi , yj). 
THEOREM 11.2. If X and Y are finite (I X 1 = n, j Y 1 = p) them exists 
an element a = (U(j)i.j.w such that the associated sepuentiaf extension p, is 
playable (and the value of r,g is the mixed value of g). For instance, p, is playable 
with the following Z: 
Proof. A standard computation shows that the adjoint form rzi* of p, is: 
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The second step is to prove that, if X has n elements, the following mapping 
is surjective: 
a: 2 - d’(X): a(n) = + f (q-l SZi . 
a=1 
(11.13) 
The end of the proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 11.1: If the 
adjoint form Z-* of an extension can be expressed as: 
n*c5 7) = 40 0 B(7), (11.14) 
where 01 is onto &i’(X) and /3 onto J$‘( Y), then this extension is playable. 1 
Thus, we have a way of playing the initial game without moves of chance 
or randomized strategies, which is nevertheless “equivalent” to the mixed 
way: Indeed, optimal strategies in the extended game p,g are well-determined 
sequences of pure strategies. Moreover, if we restrict the summation (11.10) 
to the N first terms: 
nNg(%Y) = f Q&i ,Yj), (11.15) 
i&l 
we obtain an extended game with a$nite set of extended strategies. Theorem 
(11.2) shows that, using the finite N sequences (xl . . . xN) as extended strategies 
of Xavier and finite N sequences (yl ***yN) as extended strategies of Yves, 
one obtains a game nNg which is equivalent to the mixed game up to E(N): 
4N) = II g II (r+)N + (‘+)“) . (11.16) 
(This means that the duality gap of #g is less than 2c(N) and contains the 
mixed value, and that there exist c(N)-optimal strategies for both players.) 
In the case where X or Y, but not both, is infinite it is possible, by the 
Hahn-Banach theorem, to obtain sequential extensions which are equivalent 
to the mixed extension (see [4]). 
Remark 11.1. Aumann’s “randomized and correlated strategies” (see [l]) 
are closely related to the sequential extension. Indeed, it can be shown that, 
if the lottery is countable, there is a complete isomorphism from the cor- 
related strategies (with a single “objective” probability) onto the sequential 
extensions (Definition 11.2). For more details see [4]. 
11.2. Extensions by Pure Exchange of Information 
We denote by F(Y, X) (and F(X, Y)) the set of mappings from Y into X 
(and from X into Y). The canonical embedding j from Y into 9(X, Y) is: 
j : Y -+ 9(X, Y) vx E xj (y)(x) = y. (11.17) 
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Similarly we denote by i the canonical embedding from X into P(Y, X) 
(see (1.18)). I f  5 belongs to F(Y, X) and 17 belongs to 3(X, Y) we denote 
byF(t, 7) the subset (which may be empty) of the fixed points of the mapping: 
(xv Y) - (&Y), 44). That is: 
F(E, 7) = {(x, y) E x x I'/&~) = x and n(x) =y}. (11.18) 
DEFINITION 11.3. A pair (3, “Y) such that: 
xc%ccqY, X), (11.19) 
1-c Y c qx, E’), (11.20) 
is called a feasible pair if the following holds: 
v(i? rl)~T x ‘YF([, ?) f o. (11.21) 
DEFINITION 11.4. Let (2, ‘2) be a feasible pair. Let us choose for every 
pair (t, 7) E 9 x ,JZ an element f(E, 7) of F(e, 7). Define the operator z- by: 
% E @TX x y> 4% 7) EAT- x Jy T&t, 7) = g(f(6, 7)). (11.22) 
Then p = (57, g, i, j, ) n is an extension of the games on X x Y and we 
call p an extension by pure exchange of information. 
The extended payoff function ng has the same range as g, but using their 
extended strategies, which are in fact “decision rules,” both players use some 
information about the other player’s behavior. For instance, if (55, “%) is the 
feasible pair (X, F(X, Y)), the only associated extension by pure exchange 
of information is given by: 
(11.23) 
In this extension, Yves has full information about Xavier’s behaviour. In 
other words, Xavier chooses first his pure strategy and then Yves, knowing 
this choice, chooses his pure strategy. This extension is playable, with value 
supx inf, g(x, y) and is the opposite of the previous Example 1.3(b), in which 
Xavier has full information. Note that the pair (F(Y, X), g(X, Y)) is not 
feasible: Both players can not have full information about the other player’s 
behavior! 
We now describe a more complex exchange of information, which leads 
us to another example of extension by pure exchange of information. Let r be 
an equivalence relation on X and s be an equivalence relation on Y. If  x is a 
pure strategy of Xavier, r(x) denotes its equivalence class in the quotient X/r. 
SimiIarly s(y) denotes the equivalence class of y  in Y/s. Knowing Y(.v), Yves 
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has partial information about Xavier’s behaviour. We consider the following 
scheme of exchange of information: First Xavier chooses his r(x) (but not “u) 
and then Yves, knowing Xavier’s choice, chooses his s(y) (but not y). Then 
Xavier, knowing Yves’s choice, chooses x according to his previous promise 
(that is x E r(x)) and finally Yves, knowing Xavier’s pure strategy CC, chooses 
his pure strategy y, according to his previous promise (that is y E s(y)). 
One verifies easily that this scheme is described by the feasible pair (3, ?V) 
where: 
and 
% = (6 E~(Y, X)/s(y) = s(y’) =S t(y) = t(y’) and 
r(e(y)) does not depend on y} (11.24) 
CY = (7) E&F(X, Y)/r(x) = Y(d) =- s(+v)) = s(Tj(x’))}. (11.25) 
Moreover there is only one extension by pure exchange of information 
associated with this feasible pair because F(t, r]) contains only one element, 
and this extension is playable. This example can be generalized to a scheme 
of alternate exchanges of partial information (see [4]). 
The next result (Theorem (11.3) below) is a characterization of playable 
extensions by pure exchange of information and gives a precise meaning to 
the intuitive feeling: These extensions are playable if the exchange of in- 
formation is “maximal.” 
DEFINITION 11.5. Let A be a family of subsets of X x Y. We call 
conjugate of iz and denote by A* the following set of subsets of X x Y: 
A* ={TCXx Y/VScATnS# m}. (11.26) 
LEMMA II. 1. IVe have 
A** = {TCX x Y/&SEA SC T}. (11.27) 
In the next theorem we identify a mapping 5 E S(Y, X) and/or a mapping 
q E 9(X, Y) with their graphs in X x Y. 
THEOREM 11.3. Let (a, ?V) be a pair such that 
XC%CC(Y, X) (11.28) 
Ycgcc(x, Y). (11.29) 
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Then the four following properties are equivalent 
(i) (3, Y) is a feasible pair and one of the associated extensions by pure 
exchange of information is playable; 
(ii) (3, ~3) is a feasible pair and every associated extension by pure 
exchange of information is playable (with the same value); 
(iii) T** = ‘Ty*; 
(iv) g** = .%^“. 
Property (iii) implies that, given “Y, every decision rule of Xavier 5 E 9( Y, X) 
which is “feasible with respect to Og” ([E “5V*) belongs to Z”. Then 57 is 
exactly the set of those decision rules of Xavier which are feasible with 
respect to ~9. Similarly 5’ is the set of those decision rules of Yves which are 
feasible with respect to 3. In the case of finite X and Y one can prove a 
converse of this property (“if 5 is the set of feasible decision rules with 
respect to ‘Ty, then the extensions associated with (5?“, “y) are playable”). For 
more details see [4]. 
Proof of Theorem 11.3. Let us assume that (i) holds. We want to prove 
that (iii) holds. By feasibility X C a%*, and then g** C ?4* (use Lemma 
(11.1)). In order to prove ;I%* C 5**, suppose that there exists ,4 E Jy* and 
A $ %**. Then, using Lemma II.1 we have: 
vgEzf-‘(lA (11.30) 
bJEY?jnA4 f  3. (11.31) 
The relations (11.30) and (11.31) can be expressed as: 
V’E S(E(Y)l Y) I A (11.32) 
Vq 3x(x, y(x)) E A. (11.33) 
Define g E&(X x Y) by: 
g(x, y) = 1 if (x, y) E A; g(x, y) = 0 if (x, y) $ A. (11.34) 
Then, clearly, if n is the operator of an extension by pure exchange of in- 
formation associated with (%, “Y), the function rrg has a duality interval 
equal to [0, 11. This contradicts (i), and (iii) is proved. The end of the proof 
is to establish that property (iii) implies property (ii). One uses typically the 
same kind of argument. 1 
11.3. Compound Extensions. The Iterated Games 
In this section we describe, in terms of extensions, the “partial exchange 
of information.” For that purpose, we shall compound an extension without 
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exchange of information with an extension by pure exchange of information. 
In the next part (III, Section 2) we shall show that “all” the extensions are 
equivalent (in a certain sense) to such extensions. 
PROPOSITION 11.1. Let p, = (T2”, , @I , i, , j, , nl) be an extension of 
the games on A’ x 1’ and p, = (~2”~ , Y/e , i2 , j2 , rr2) be an extension of 
the games on .X1 x ~3’~ (r2 maps .d(l; x VI) into &(X2 x J3p)), Then 
p =(~*;a,,;,oi,,j~Ojl, n2 0 =J is an extension of the games on S x Y. 
We call p the extension “pl compounded with p, .” 
The proof is standard. 
DEFINITION 11.6. An extension with partial exchange of information is 
an extension without exchange of information compounded with an extension 
by pure exchange of information. 
M’e just illustrate this definition by the example of iterated games. Consider 
a sequential extension (Definition (11.2)) p, . The extended strategy spaces 
of such an extension are 2 and f. Now, consider an extension by pure 
exchange of information p of the games on x x P: We only describe the 
scheme of exchange of information associated withp (for a precise formulation, 
see [4]). Let -4 and B be two subsets of N. The scheme is as follows: Xavier 
chooses .v i ; Yves knows .x1 if 1 E B (otherwise he does not know xl). Yves 
chooses yi ; Xavier knows yi if I E A (otherwise he does not know yi). 
Xavier chooses ~a ; Yves knows ~a if 2 E B; Yves chooses ys and so on. 
Then the set A is the set of those i such that, before he chooses xi+i , Xavier 
knows yi . The set B is the set of those j such that, before he chooses yj , 
Jives knows xj . If A = B = N, then the information is “perfect,” and 
if J = B = E, there is no exchange of information. 
The compound of p, with p is called an iterated game, and is an extension 
with partial exchange of information. In general, an iterated game is not 
playable, but one can show that the duality gap of the iterated game described 
before is bounded by: 
2 llg II . (l - 1 %j - C uij) (11.35) 
iEA jcB 
i<j j<i 
(where g is the initial payoff function). This bound illustrates the intuitive 
feeling: The larger is the exchange of information, the less is the duality gap. 
A specially interesting iterated game is the ergodic game described in the 
Introduction (see (0.7)). In fact, it is a limiting case of a sequential game and 
its definition needs the Hahn-Banach theorem. Indeed, the limit 
(11.36) 
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does not always exist. However, the Hahn-Banach theorem asserts that we 
can extend the “Cesaro mean limit” operator to all sequences of real numbers, 
and then the ergodic game is well defined as an extension with partial exchange 
of information. The main result is that the ergodic game is playable, that 
there are stationary optimal strategies, and that neither the value, nor the 
optimal strategies depend on the particular extension we have chosen for 
the Cesaro mean limit operator. This result is well known in the case of 
finite X and Y (see [3]) and follows from [5] in the case of compact X and I 
with continuous g. 
III. VALUE FUNCTIONS 
III. 1. Charactmkation of Value Functions 
Let p = (S, JY, i, j, n) be a playable extension of the games on X x I-. 
We call the value function associated with p, denoted vD , the function 
0,: sqx x I-) -+ R, 
v,(g) = yp iqf v(5, rl) = i;f yp ng(t, rl). 
(111.1) 
DEFINITION III.1. A value function is a function v 
v: d(X x Y) -+ R (111.2) 
such that there exists a playable extensionp of the games on X x Y satisfying: 
vi? E 4x x Y) v(g) = v,(g)* (111.3) 
If we consider as equivalent two playable extensions with the same value 
function, the next result is then a characterization of the playable extensions. 
THEOREM III. 1. A function v: &(X X Y) -+ [w is a value function if and 
only if the four following properties hold: 
vg VA > 0 v(hg) = h(g), (111.4) 
vg VA v(g + he) = v(g) + A (111.5) 
kl 9 g*k, b g*) * (Vkl) a vkz)), (111.6) 
Vg sup inf g(x, y) < z](g) < inf sup g(x, y). (111.7) 
x 3’ Y  x 
Properties (111.4) and (111.5) mean that v is “affine” for very simple affine 
transformations of the payoff g. Property (111.6) means that v is increasing 
TWO PERSON ZERO SUM GAMES 505 
with respect to the partial ordering of &(X x E’) and property (111.7) 
means that the “value” always belongs to the duality interval. These four 
very “natural” properties are an “a posteriori” justification to the basic 
assumption of linearity of the extension operator. Indeed, in Definition I.1 
this assumption seems to be there for mathematical convenience only. But 
Theorem III.1 shows that this leads us to all “possible” value functions. 
What could be the interest of “nonlinear” extensions, leading to some “value 
function” for which one of the properties (111.4) to (111.7) fails ? 
Remark 111.1. In Theorem III.1 we can replace properties (111.5) and 
(111.6) by the equivalent (111.8): 
v(g1) - v(g,> < SUP (&(%Y) - R&~YN* (111.8) 
(Z,2/EXXY 
We could express property (111.8) as: ZI is “positively I-Lipschitzian.” 
Proof of Theorem 111.1. First of all the definition of an extension and 
Proposition I.1 clearly imply that, if v is a value function, then v verifies 
(111.4) to (111.7). The difficult part of the proof is the converse. 
Let I’ be the set of value functions. 
Step 1. If  WQEA is a family of elements of V, then SUP,%,,~ z’, and 
inLEA v, belong to V. 
Letp,=(~a,~a,i,,j,, z-J be a playable extension with value function v’, . 
We just consider the case where 01 1 1, 2. The general case is no more 
difficult. Let 3 be the “sum” of x1 and Sz (S? = 3i u !Ez if Z1 and S2”, are 
disjoint). Let 3’ = g1 x C!Vy, and j be the one-to-one mapping: 
j: Y-g j(y) = (ilb%jz(~N. (111.9) 
Define now the linear operator ST by its adjoint form rr* (see Proposition 1.2) 
WY (71 3 72)) ES x +Y n*(E, (71 ,7,)) = fl*(4,7d if 5 E 3, 
= 7r*(.$, 7z) if 6 E?Z*. (111.10) 
Thenp=(?Z,ZV,i,,j, ) 7r is an extension of the games on X x Y and one 
verifies that p is playable with value sup(vl , va). 
Step 2. Let v,, : d(X x Y) --f F% be a function such that 
Vgl , g, E JG’(X x Y): 3~) E V v,(g,) = v(gi) and v,,(g,) = v(ga). (III. 
Then v,, belongs to V. 
Put 
11) 
w = sup{v/a E v, v < zJO} < v0 . (III. 12) 
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By assumption (111.7) w is well defined and by Step 1, w belongs to V. 
For any fixed g, E la/(X x I), put 
V Bg = inf{v/e> E I,‘, v(ge) = va(gJ}. (111.13) 
By assumption (III. 11) v,~ is well defined and, moreover 
Z’ &) i; vo . (111.14) 
By Step 1, z190 belongs to I-, and then (111.14) implies: 
Z$, :.,< a! I::; z.0 , 
In particular 
(111.15) 
%,(go) = %l(go) sz WkcJ G %(A%)- (111.16) 
This proves ZJ,, = zu and Step 2 is proved. 
Step 3. Let v: &(X x I’)+ R be afunction such that (111.4) to (111.7) 
hold. Then for every $xed g, and g, in zZ(X x Y) there exists an element m 
of dl’(X >: I-) such that: 
[w P-J G v(gd and 4gd < [m, sd (111.17) 
Consider the following two person zero sum game: The strategy set of player 
1 is (1, 2) and the strategy set of the second player is X X’ Y. The payoff 
function is L: 
L( 1, (.? Y)) = gd.5 Y) - ZW~ 
w, (x, Y)) = -&(G Y) + Z’!&). 
(111.18) 
Let a be the mixed value of this game. One proves first, using the mixed 
strategies of player 1, and properties (111.4) and (III@, that 01 is less than or 
equal to 0. One verifies then, that an optimal strategy m of player 2 satisfies 
inequality (111.17). 
Step 4. End of the proof. Let v: &f/(X x Y) -+ R be a function such 
that (111.4) to (III.?‘) hold. By Step 3, for every fixed g1 and g, in Z/(-X i: Y) 
there exist m, and ma in s4,‘(X x Y) such that: 
(111.19) 
One constructs then an extension p, for which each extended strategy set has 
exactly two nonpure extended strategies, and which verifies: 
Zl(,gi) == s;P inf Tfi(4,?) i= 1,2. (111.20) 
7 
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From (111.20) one deduces easily that there exists v E I’ such that 
4%) = @(gJ i = 1, 2. (111.21) 
Finally, z’ satisfies (111.11) and then belongs to V. 1 
111.2. Value Functions and Compound Extensions 
Let us say that two playable extensions are equivalent if they have the 
same value function. 
THEOREM 111.2. Every playable extension is equivaknt to an extension 
with partial exchange of information. That is, if v  is a value function, there 
exist an extension without exchange of information and an extension by pure 
exchange of information, whose compounded p satisjies: 
vg E d(X x I-), r(g) = s;p inf 7rg(.$, 7) = inf s;p ng(f, 7). (111.22) 
?) $ 
Proof. Step 1. Let Q&A be a family of extensions with partial exchange 
of information: For every 01, p, is the compound of pa,l, without exchange of 
information, with pm2, by pure exchange of information. We assume that, 
for every 01, pa1 verifies: 
vY(%v* v-2 x -Q,(Y)>) = 4’V) 0 %I (111.23) 
and 
Vx(7re1)* ({iJx)} :x’ ‘32) = 6, $J dl’(Y). (111.24) 
Now, using the same kind of construction as in Step 1 of the proof of Theorem 
111.1, one can prove that there exists an extension p with partial exchange of 
information (p is the compound of p, with pe) such that p, verifies (111.23) 
and (111.24) and such that p is playable with value function SUP,,.~ (v,J 
(where v), is the value function of pa). The same result is true with the infimum 
instead of the supremum. 
Step 2. Let m be an element of J&:(X x Y). Define v,, by: 
vg E d(X x Y), 
sup inf g(x, y) if [m, gl < yp infg(x, y) 
v,(g) = in; suYp g(“v, y) if inf sup d-5 y) 2 [m, 81 (111.25) 
u 2 
c9 R; otherwise. 
One proves that z’, is the value function of an extension p with partial 
exchange of information (p is the compound of p, with p2) such that p1 
verifies (111.23) and (111.24). 
409!55/2-17 
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Step 3. If  v  is the value function of an extension p q 
we put: 
~*(t, 7) = m,,, . 
Then v  can be written as 
vg E d(X x Y), v(g) = sup inf[m,,, , gl. 
c 11 
A simple computation shows that 
vg E d(X x Y), v(g) = syp infv~&g). 
R 
By Step 1 and Step 2 the function vE 





is then the value function of an extension with partial exchange of information 
verifying (111.23) and (111.24). Applying Step 1 once more, v  is the value 
function of an extension with partial exchange of information (verifying 
(111.23) and (111.24)). 1 
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